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Abstract. The relation between agentive action, knowledge, and obligation is
central to the understanding of responsibility –a main topic in Artificial Intelli-
gence. Based on the view that an appropriate formalization of said relation would
contribute to the development of ethical AI, we point out the main characteris-
tics of a logic for objective and subjective oughts that was recently introduced
in the literature. This logic extends the traditional stit paradigm with deontic and
epistemic operators, and provides a semantics that deals with Horty’s puzzles for
knowledge and obligation. We provide an axiomatization for this logic, and ad-
dress its soundness and completeness with respect to a class of relevant models.
1 Introduction
AI developers face a big challenge in creating systems that are expected to make ethi-
cally charged decisions. The field of machine ethics has seen a quick growth in recent
years, and questions regarding responsibility of autonomous agents are very important.
In our opinion, these questions can be categorized in two main trends: 1) conceptual
questions that deal with the ontology and essential components of the notion of respon-
sibility, and 2) technical questions concerning the implementation of such notion in AI.
This work attempts to make a contribution in the technical category. We take part in a
very specific line of research, where proof systems of deontic logic are intended to help
in the testing of ethical behavior of AI through theorem proving ([1], [9], [3]). That
being said, answers to the technical kind of questions typically presuppose a particu-
lar choice of philosophical standpoint against questions of the first kind, the conceptual
one. Our philosophical standpoint comes from John Horty’s framework of act utilitarian
stit logic ([8]), extended with epistemic relations. As such, we make explicit the goal of
the present paper: to provide well-behaved formalizations of 3 essential components of
responsibility of intelligent systems: agentive action, knowledge, and obligation.
According to [1], having an expressive deontic logic with practical relevance and
an efficient algorithm for proving theorem-hood is highly applicable in the construction
of logic-based ethical robots.3 To support this statement, Arkoudas et al. present in [1]
a natural deduction calculus for a logic of ought-to-do that was developed by Horty
in [8] and axiomatised by Murakami in [9]. With an interactive theorem proving sys-
tem named ATHENA, they illustrate the fact that we can mechanize deontic logic to do
machine ethics.
3 See [10] for an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of doing machine ethics via
theorem proving.
The starting point of our work comes from a recent interest in enhancing both the
expressivity and practical relevance of Horty’s stit theory of ought-to-do in order to deal
with situations in which agents’ knowledge becomes significant. Inspired by 3 puzzles
for knowledge-dependent obligations that pose a problem for merely extending his ini-
tial logic with epistemic operators, Horty presents in [6] a novel semantics for epistemic
oughts based on action types. Although the approach is substantial, it comes with 3 dis-
advantages: (1) it diverges from his work in [8], (2) there are semantic constraints that
limit the expressivity of the models, and (3) the use of action types precludes an efficient
axiomatization.4
With similar motivations as Horty, the extended abstract [5] proposes an alternative
logic –where the main idea is to distinguish objective from subjective obligations– that
allegedlymitigates the disadvantagesmentioned above. The authors claim that this logic
is simpler, more naturally connected to Horty’s work in [8], and axiomatizable. Being
very brief, [5] only deals with the conceptual benefits of the proposal, and the proof of
soundness and completeness of the logic’s proof system is only mentioned. Here, we
recover the definition of this logic, address its benefits, and show that its proof system is
indeed sound and complete with respect to a class of relevant models.We do this hoping
that the results will give some background to new developments in the mechanization
of deontic logic for ethical AI, in the aforementioned tradition of [1] and [3].
The paper is structured as follows. After a short presentation of stit and its apli-
cations in the modeling of action, knowledge, and obligation, we go through Horty’s
puzzles. We mention his solution to them and justify the claim that his approach with
action types comes with disadvantages. Afterwards, we present the logic developed by
[5], show how it solves Horty’s puzzles, and deal with its axiomatizability.5
2 Action, Knowledge, and Obligation in Stit
We want to consider oughts from the perspective that an agent should be excused for
having failed at an obligation if it lacks the necessary knowledge to perform a required
task (doctors ought to stop the bleeding of the patient, but if they do not know how to,
they should be excused). A typical framework for expressing statements that involve
knowledge for required tasks as a component of responsibility is stit logic ([2]). Stit
logic was created to formalize the concept of action, so it naturally lent itself to the study
of obligation ([8]) and of knowingly doing ([4]), all important elements in the notion of
responsibility. For a comprehensive review of the interaction of these 3 concepts in the
literature, we refer the reader to [11].
The 3 puzzles of Horty that we mentioned in the introduction are actually very good
illustrations of how stit deals with action, knowledge, and obligation, but in order to
tackle them we need to recover basic definitions of the paradigm known as act utilitar-
ian stit logic. In this paradigm, obligation stems from a dominance ordering over the set
of available actions. The idea is that the effects of the best actions in the ordering –the
4 We will justify all these claims in the second section of this paper, after introducing the 3
puzzles and addressing Horty’s solution.
5 The proof of completeness is dense and technical, so the full proofs of each statement are
provided in the appendix section of the present work.
so-called optimal actions– are the obligations of a given agent at a given moment. We
proceed to introduce the basic aspects of an extension of act utilitarian stit logic with
epistemic modalities, and leave its examples to the section where we present Horty’s
puzzles.
Definition 1 (Syntax).Given a finite setAgs of agent names, a countable set of propo-
sitions P such that p ∈ P and α ∈ Ags, the grammar for the formal language LKO is
given by:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ | [α]ϕ | Kαϕ | ⊙[α]ϕ
ϕ is meant to express the ‘historical necessity’ of ϕ (♦ϕ abbreviates ¬¬ϕ). [α]ϕ
stands for ‘agent α sees to it that ϕ’.Kα is the epistemic operator for α. Finally,⊙[α]ϕ
is meant to represent that α ought to see to it that ϕ.
As for the semantics, the structures in which we evaluate formulas of the language
LKO are based on what we call epistemic act utilitarian branching time frames.
Definition 2 (Branching time (BT) frames). A finite-choice epistemic act utilitarian
BT -frame is a tuple 〈T,⊏,Choice, {∼α}α∈Ags,Value〉 such that:
– T is a non-empty set of moments and ⊏ is a strict partial ordering on T satisfying
‘no backward branching’. Each maximal ⊏-chain is called a history, which repre-
sents a way in which time might evolve. H denotes the set of all histories, and for
each m ∈ T , Hm := {h ∈ H ;m ∈ h}. Tuples 〈m,h〉 are called situations iff
m ∈ T , h ∈ H , and m ∈ h. Choice is a function that maps each agent α and
momentm to a finite partitionChoicemα ofHm, where the cells of such a partition
represent α’s available actions atm.Choice satisfies two constraints:
• (NC) or ‘no choice between undivided histories’.- For all h, h′ ∈ Hm, if m′ ∈
h ∩ h′ for somem′ ⊐ m, then h ∈ L iff h′ ∈ L for every L ∈ Choicemα .
• (IA) or ‘independence of agency’.- A function s on Ags is called a selection
function at m if it assigns to each α a member of Choicemα . If we denote by
Select
m the set of all selection functions at m, then we have that for every
m ∈ T and s ∈ Selectm,
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅ (see [2] for a discussion of the
property).
– For α ∈ Ags, ∼α is the epistemic indistinguishability equivalence relation for
agent α.
– Value is a deontic function that assigns to each history h ∈ H a real number,
representing the utility of h.
As mentioned before, the idea is that obligations come from the optimal actions for
a given agent. The optimality of such actions is relative to a dominance ordering of the
actions, and this ordering is given by the value of the histories in those actions –itself
provided byValue. In order to present the semantics for formulas involving the ought-
to-do operator, we therefore need some previous definitions. For α ∈ Ags andm∗ ∈ T ,
we define a dominance ordering  on Choicem∗α such that for L,L
′ ∈ Choicem∗α ,
L  L′ iffValue(h) ≤ Value(h′) for every h ∈ L, h′ ∈ L′. We write L ≺ L′ iff
L  L′ and L′  L. The optimal set of actions, then, is taken as Optimalm∗α :=
{L ∈ Choicem∗α ; there is no L
′ ∈ Choicem∗α such that L ≺ L
′}. As is customary, the
models and the semantics for the formulas are defined by adding a valuation function
to the frames of Definition 2:
Definition 3. A BT-modelM consists of the tuple that results from adding a valuation
function V to a BT-frame, where V : P → 2T×H assigns to each atomic proposition
a set of moment-history pairs. Relative to a modelM, the semantics for the formulas
of LKO is defined recursively by the following truth conditions, evaluated at a given
situation 〈m,h〉:
〈m,h〉 |= p iff 〈m,h〉 ∈ V(p)
〈m,h〉 |= ¬ϕ iff 〈m,h〉 6|= ϕ
〈m,h〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ and 〈m,h〉 |= ψ
〈m,h〉 |= ϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ Hm, 〈m,h′〉 |= ϕ
〈m,h〉 |= [α]ϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ Choicemα (h), 〈m,h
′〉 |= ϕ
〈m,h〉 |= Kαϕ iff ∀〈m′, h′〉 s.t. 〈m,h〉 ∼α 〈m′, h′〉, 〈m′, h′〉 |= ϕ
〈m,h〉 |= ⊙[α]ϕ iff ∀L ∈ Optimalmα , h
′ ∈ L implies that 〈m,h′〉 |= ϕ.
Satisfiability, validity on a frame, and general validity are defined as usual. We write
|ϕ|m to refer to the set {h ∈ Hm;M, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ}.
2.1 Horty’s Puzzles
The 3 puzzles that we have mentioned since the beginning of the paper, and that pose
a problem for formalizing epistemic oughts just with the epistemic extension of act
utilitarian logic, can be summarized as follows.
Example 1. Agent β places a coin on top of a table –either heads up or tails up– but
hides it from agent α. Agent α can bet that the coin is heads up, that it is tails up, or
it can refrain from betting. If α bets and chooses correctly, it wins e10. If it chooses
incorrectly, it does not win anything, and if it refrains from betting, it wins e5.
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Fig. 1: Coin problem #1
The stit diagram that represents Horty’s interpretation of the situation is included
in Figure 1. In this diagram, we take H to denote the proposition ‘β places the coin
heads up’, T to denote ‘β places the coin tails up’,BH to denote ‘α bets heads’,BT to
denote ‘α bets tails’, andG to denote ‘α gambles’. In momentm1, β places the coin on
top of the table, so that its available actions are labeled by L1 (placing the coin heads
up) and L2 (placing the coin tails up). At moments m2 and m3, it is α’s turn to act,
and the available actions are clear from the picture. The blue dotted line represents the
epistemic class of α: since β is hiding the coin, α cannot distinguish whether it is at
momentm2 orm3.
6 For such an interpretation regarding the epistemic structure of the
agent, a problem ensues due to the fact that for every i ∈ {2, 3} and h ∈ Hmi , we have
that 〈mi, h〉 |= Kα⊙[α]G. This means that α knows that it ought to gamble, even if this
is a ‘risky’ move that could result in a payoff of 0. In this sense, we could say that the
agent’s knowledge of what is optimal would lead it into taking a chance and gambling.
Example 2. With the same scheme as in the previous example, if α bets and chooses
correctly, it wins e10. If it refrains from betting, it also wins e10. If it bets incorrectly,
it does not win anything.
Intuitively, α ought to refrain from gambling in this scenario, for refraining implies that
it would win by the same amount as when betting correctly but without engaging in an
action that could possibly fail. In this case, the problem is that for every i ∈ {2, 3} and
h ∈ Hmi , we have that 〈mi, h〉 6|= Kα⊙ [α]¬G: α does not know that it ought to refrain
from gambling. Figure 2 includes the stit diagram for this scenario.
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Fig. 2: Coin problem #2
Example 3. With the same scheme as in the previous examples, if α bets and chooses
correctly, it wins e10. If it bets incorrectly or refrains from betting, it does not win
anything.
The problem here is that for every i ∈ {2, 3} and h ∈ Hmi , 〈mi, h〉 |= Kα⊙ [α]W ,
where W is the proposition that stands for ‘α wins’. This means that α knows that it
ought to win at any given situation, but such knowledge is not action-guiding, meaning
that it will not provide α with a choice to make. Though the agent knowingly ought
6 Notice that Horty’s formalization also yields that in none of the situations will α knowingly
perform any of the available actions: it cannot epistemically distinguish between the situations
in which it is ‘betting heads’, ‘betting tails’, or ‘refraining’.
to win, it cannot knowingly do so –it simply does not have the means due to a lack of
knowledge. Thus, Kant’s principle of ‘ought implies can’ is not satisfied (〈mi, h〉 6|=
Kα ⊙ [α]W → ♦Kα[α]W ). Figure 3 includes the stit diagram for this scenario.
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Fig. 3: Coin problem #3
Horty solves these 3 puzzles by introducing both syntactic and semantic addenda to
epistemic act utilitarian stit logic. He extends the language with an operator [... kstit]
to encode the concept of ex interim knowledge (or knowingly doing). The semantics for
formulas involving this operator uses action types, with the premise that actions of the
same typemay lead to different outcomes in different moments (see [7]). Unfortunately,
the introduction of the new operator and of types comes with two unfavorable semantic
constraints:
1. In order for [... kstit] to be an S5 operator, the epistemic relations must ensue not
between moment-history pairs but between moments. The problem with this con-
dition is that it limits the class of models to those in which knowledge is moment-
dependent (agents will not be able to know that they perform a given action),7
2. Indistinguishable moments must offer the same available types. The problem with
this constraint is that it cannot be characterized syntactically without producing an
infinite axiomatization. This is due to the fact that performing a certain action type
can only be expressed syntactically with propositional constants (again, see [7] for
the details).8
As a solution to the stated puzzles, Horty’s approach is successful. However, [5]
claims that we can also be successful without using action types. The benefits of the
framework presented in [5], then, include technical characterizability of the constraints
imposed on the structures –which is important for axiomatization–, semantic simplicity,
and enhanced expressivity. In the following section, all these claims will be substanti-
ated.
7 Horty’s models satisfy the following constraint: if 〈m,h〉 ∼α 〈m
′, h′〉 then 〈m,h′〉 ∼α
〈m′, h′′〉 for every h′ ∈ Hm, h
′′ ∈ Hm′ .
8 It is an open problem to determine whether there is a finite axiomatization of Horty’s logic of
epistemic action and obligation if the types were also included in the object language.
3 A Logic of Objective and Subjective oughts
[5] proposes to disambiguate two senses of ought-to-do in order to produce a system
that solves Horty’s puzzles, avoids action types, and is axiomatizable. The two senses
are an objective one, which coincides with Horty’s act utilitarian ought-to-do, and a
subjective one, which arises from the epistemically best candidates in the set of avail-
able actions for a given agent. By ‘epistemically best’ we mean those actions that are
undominated not only in the actual moment but whose all epistemic equivalents across
different indistinguishable situations are also undominated.
Essentially, we are talking about an extension of the language in Definition 1 with a
new operator⊙S [α], meant to build up formulas that would express what α subjectively
ought to do. As for the semantics of this new operator, it involves a dominance ordering
as well, but one different to that which is used for objective ought-to-do’s. In order
to define this subjective dominance ordering, [5] introduces a new semantic concept
known as epistemic clusters, which are nothing more than a given action’s epistemic
equivalents in situations that are indistinguishable to the actual one. Formally, we have
that for α ∈ Ags,m∗,m ∈ T , and L ⊆ Hm∗ , L’s epistemic cluster atm is the set
[L]mα := {h ∈ Hm; ∃h∗ ∈ L s.t. 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉}.
As a convention, we write m ∼α m′ if there exist h ∈ Hm, h′ ∈ Hm′ such that
〈m,h〉 ∼α 〈m
′, h′〉. The notion of epistemic clusters is used to define a subjective
dominance ordering s on Choice
m∗
α by the following rule: for L,L
′ ∈ Choicem∗α ,
L s L′ iff for every m such that m∗ ∼α m, Value(h) ≤ Value(h′) for every
h ∈ [L]mα , h
′ ∈ [L′]mα . Just as in the case of objective ought-to-do’s, this ordering
allows us to define a subjectively optimal set of actions S− optimalm∗α := {L ∈
Choice
m∗
α ; there is no L
′ ∈ Choicem∗α s. t. L ≺s L
′}, where we write L ≺s L′ iff
L s L′ and L′ s L. The idea, then, is that something will be a subjective obligation
of a given agent at a givenmoment if it is an effect of all the subjectively optimal actions
of that agent at that moment.
As established in [5], the models in which to evaluate the formulas of the extended
language need to satisfy extra constraints in order to capture an appropriate interaction
of action, knowledge, and subjective obligation. By this we mean to say that in these
models (a) agents should be able to knowingly do the same things across epistemically
indistinguishable states, (b) the subjective ought-to-do must conform to Kant’s direc-
tive of ‘ought implies can’ in its epistemic version of ‘subjectively ought-to-do implies
ability of knowingly doing’, and (c) if something is a subjective ought-to-do of a given
agent, then the agent should know that that is the case. Therefore, we focus on models
that fulfill the following requirements, which will grant the conditions mentioned above
(as can be seen from the proof of soundness):
– (OAC) For every situation 〈m∗, h∗〉, if 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉 for some 〈m,h〉, then
〈m∗, h′∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉 for every h
′
∗ ∈ Choice
m∗
α (h∗). We refer to this constraint as
the ‘own action condition’, since it implies that agents do not knowmore than what
they perform. Because of this constraint, the knowledge that we are formalizing
here is of a very particular kind: to know something is just the same as to knowingly
do it.
– (Unif− H) For every situation 〈m∗, h∗〉, if 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉 for some 〈m,h〉,
then for every h′∗ ∈ Hm∗ , there exists h
′ ∈ Hm such that 〈m∗, h′∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h
′〉.
Combined with (OAC), this constraint is meant to capture a notion of uniformity
of strategies, where epistemically indistinguishable situations should offer similar
actions for the agent to choose upon.We call this condition ‘uniformity of historical
possibility’.
In finite-choice epistemic act utilitarian BT-models that satisfy these two constraints,
then, the semantics for the formulas involving⊙S [α] is defined as expected:
〈m,h〉 |= ⊙S [α]ϕ iff ∀L ∈ S− optimal
m
α , ∀m
′ s.t.m ∼α m
′, [L]m
′
α ⊆ |ϕ|
m′ .
3.1 Solution to Horty’s Puzzles
The semantics for subjective ought-to-do’s offers solutions to natural interpretations
of Horty’s puzzles, in which the assumption that the coin is hidden from the bet-
ting agent is captured by taking ∼α to be defined by the following information sets:
{〈m2, h1〉, 〈m3, h4〉}, in which α bets heads; {〈m2, h2〉, 〈m3, h5〉}, in which α bets
tails; and {〈m2, h3〉, 〈m3, h6〉}, in which α refrains from betting.
For Example 1, the problem is solved because although 〈mi, hi〉 |= Kα ⊙ [α]G,
we consider this as the knowledge of an objective ought-to-do. Subjectively speak-
ing, we do not obtain that α knows that it ought to gamble: 〈mi, hi〉 6|= ⊙S [α]G and
thus 〈mi, hi〉 6|= Kα ⊙S [α]G. This can be seen by noticing that S−Optimal
m2
α =
{L3, L4, L5} and S−Optimal
m3
α = {L6, L7, L8}. Figure 4 provides a stit diagram
for this scenario.
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Fig. 4: Coin problem #1, revisited
In Example 2, the problem is solved because 〈mi, hi〉 |= ⊙S [α]¬G and 〈mi, hi〉 |=
Kα ⊙S [α]¬G (notice that S−Optimal
m2
α = {L5} and S−Optimal
m3
α = {L8}).
For Example 3, the problem is solved because we obtain that 〈mi, hi〉 6|= ⊙S [α]W ,
which in turn implies that 〈mi, hi〉 6|= Kα ⊙S [α]W (notice that S−Optimal
m2
α =
{L3, L4, L5} and S−Optimal
m3
α = {L6, L7, L8}). Therefore, although α knows
that it objectively ought to win, it is not the case that it subjectively ought to win.
When comparing these solutions to Horty’s, it is important to point out that the
formalization we are using is different from his, for it presupposes that the indistin-
guishability relation for agent α ensues between situations. Regardless of such dif-
ference, the solution is virtually the same: for Example 1, Horty gets that for every
h ∈ Hm2 〈m2, h〉 6|= ⊙[α kstit]G. For Example 2, he gets that for every h ∈ Hm2
〈m2, h〉 |= ⊙[α kstit]¬G, and for Example 3, he gets that for every h ∈ Hm2
〈m2, h〉 6|= ⊙[α kstit]W . Therefore, we can see that the notion of ⊙S [α] works as
an analog of ⊙[... kstit].
4 Axiomatization and Some Logical Properties
In this section, we introduce a proof system for the logic presented, address its sound-
ness and completeness results, and mention a few interesting properties of it.
Definition 4 (Proof system). LetΛ be the proof system defined by the following axioms
and rules of inference:
(Axioms)
– All classical tautologies from propositional logic.
– The S5 axiom schemata for , [α], Kα,
9
– The following axiom schemata for the interactions of formulas with the given oper-
ators:
⊙ [α](p→ q)→ (⊙[α]p→ ⊙[α]q) (A1)
p→ [α]p ∧ ⊙[α]p (A2)
⊙ [α]p ∨¬ ⊙ [α]p (A3)
⊙ [α]p→ ⊙[α]([α]p) (A4)
⊙ [α]p→ ♦[α]p (Oic)
For n ≥ 1 and pairwise different α1, . . . , αn,
∧
1≤k≤n
♦[αi]pi → ♦

 ∧
1≤k≤n
[αi]pi

 (IA)
⊙S [α](p→ q)→ (⊙S [α]p→ ⊙S [α]q) (A5)
⊙S [α]p→ ⊙S [α](Kαp) (A6)
Kαp→ [α]p (OAC)
♦Kαp→ Kα♦p (Unif −H)
Kαp→ ⊙S [α]p (s.N)
⊙S [α]p→ ♦Kαp (s.Oic)
⊙S [α]p→ Kα⊙S [α]p (Cl)
(Rules of inference)
– Modus Ponens, Substitution, and Necessitation for the modal operators.
9 The S5 axiom schemata are standard from modal logic, and we include their names here just
for coherence. They are (K), (T ), (4), and (5).
Schema (IA) encodes ‘independence of agency’. (OAC) encodes the ‘own action
condition’. (Unif − H) encodes the ‘uniformity of historical possibility’ constraint.
(Oic) and (s.Oic) concern the objective, resp. subjective, versions of Kant’s directive of
‘ought implies can’. (s.N) (standing for ‘subjective necessity’) captures that all that is
historically necessary at epistemically indistinguishable situations must be a subjective
obligation, and (Cl) (standing for ‘closure’) characterizes a property that says that if
one subjectively ought to do something, then one knows that that is settled.
The axiom system Λ turns out to be sound and complete with respect to the class
of epistemic act utilitarian bi-valued BT-models. Such models are more general than
the ones introduced in Definition 3. Instead of only one value function, there are two:
one for the objective ought-to-do’s, and the other for the subjective ones.10 These mod-
els, then, are of the form 〈T,⊏,Choice, {∼α}α∈Ags,ValueO,ValueS〉. As such, the
models in Definition 3 are particular instances of bi-valued models, in which both value
functions assign the same value to each history of the tree.
Furthermore, our soundness and completeness results presuppose a logic of ought-
to-do that deals with the ‘sure-thing principle’, according to which the ranking of the
available actions of a given agent should take into consideration what all the other
agents choose concurrently. For a given agent, the action profiles of the other agents
are seen as the possible states in which the agent will act (see [8], Chapter 4, subsection
4.1.2). We implement Horty’s approach for dealing with the ‘sure-thing principle’ in
the logic that we axiomatize, and this means that the semantics that we use is in fact a
generalization of the one introduced before. In order to address such a generalization
and the soundness and completeness results, we need further definitions:
Form ∈ T and β ∈ Ags, we define
Statemβ = {S ⊆ Hm;S =
⋂
α∈Ags−{β}
s(α), where s ∈ Selectm}.
With this notion of states, we redefine the dominance orderings so that the actions
are measured taking into consideration the states which those actions are facing. For
α ∈ Ags and m∗ ∈ T , we first define a general ordering ≤ on P(Hm∗) such that
10 This extension is extremely useful for the proof of completeness, but neither its conceptual
reach nor its philosophical implications has been a subject of our investigation as of yet. There
are more than a few reasons to entertain skepticism about this technical decision, since it
is not grounded philosophically. To have two deontic functions instead of one lends itself to
potentially having different values for histories according to whether their utility is objective or
subjective. However, we must observe that the notions of objective and subjective utility are not
what drives the disambiguation of ought-to-do into objective and subjective obligations. What
drives it is the epistemic structure of a given agent. Therefore, the use of two value functions
should not be taken as essential for the proposal of the logic presented here. Moreover, the
soundness result works for models in which there is only one deontic function, and the solution
to Horty’s puzzles does not rely on there being two. On a related note, we make explicit that
the focus of this work was to develop well-behaved semantics for subjective ought-to-do’s in
the stit tradition, so that if we presented a language with only the subjective-ought operator
and not the objective one, as well as with the operators for knowledge, action, and historical
necessity, then our proof of completeness would in fact be enough to show completeness of
this fragment with respect to the class of single-valued epistemic act utilitarian BT-models.
for X,Y ⊆ Hm∗ , X ≤ Y iffValueO(h) ≤ ValueO(h
′) for every h ∈ X,h′ ∈ Y .
The objective dominance ordering  is now defined such that for L,L′ ∈ Choicem∗α ,
L  L′ iff ∀S ∈ Statem∗α , L ∩ S ≤ L
′ ∩ S. As for the subjective ought-to-do’s,
we first define a general ordering ≤s on P(Hm∗) such that for X,Y ⊆ Hm∗ , X ≤s
Y iffValueS(h) ≤s ValueS(h′) for all h ∈ X,h′ ∈ Y. The subjective dominance
ordering s is then defined such that for L,L′ ⊆ Hm∗ , L s L
′ iff ∀m such that
m∗ ∼α m, ∀S ∈ State
m
α , [L]
m
α ∩ S ≤s [L
′]mα ∩ S.
With these definitions, we adapt the semantics for the formulas involving ought-to-
do operators, making the logic strong enough to deal with the ‘sure-thing principle’:
we set 〈m,h〉 |= ⊙[α]ϕ iff for every L ∈ Choicemα such that 〈m,hL〉 2 ϕ for some
hL ∈ L, there exists L′ ∈ Choice
m
α such that L ≺ L
′ and if L′′ = L or L′  L′′,
then 〈m,h′〉  ϕ for every h′ ∈ L′′. Similarly, we set 〈m,h〉 |= ⊙S [α]ϕ iff for every
L ∈ Choicemα such that 〈m
′, hL〉 2 ϕ for some hL ∈ [L]m
′
α (m ∼α m
′), there exists
L′ ∈ Choicemα such that L ≺s L
′ and if L′′ = L′ or L′ s L′′, then for every m′′
such thatm ∼α m′′, 〈m′′, h′′〉  ϕ for every h′′ ∈ [L′′]m
′′
α .
4.1 Soundness
Proposition 1. The system Λ is sound with respect to the class of epistemic act utilitar-
ian bi-valued BT-models.
Proof. Standard. See Appendix for details.
4.2 Completeness
For reasons of space, we can only summarize the proof here, leaving the full detailed
exposition for the Appendix. The proof of completeness of Λ with respect to the class
of epistemic act utilitarian bi-valued BT-models is a two-step process. First, we intro-
duce relational structures called Kripke-estit models for evaluating the formulas of the
language LKO under a semantics that mirrors the semantics of Definition 3, and prove
completeness of Λ with respect to these structures via the technique of canonical mod-
els. Secondly, we provide a truth-preserving correspondence between Kripke-estit mod-
els and certain epistemic act utilitarian bi-valued BT-models, so that completeness with
respect to Kripke-estit models grants it with respect to bi-valued BT-models. Essential
to the success of the technique of canonical models is to prove the so-called existence
and truth lemmas just as in modal logic. In the case of this particular proof system,
these lemmas are quite involved, and the reader is encouraged to go over them in the
Appendix, which offers enough room to address all their features carefully and with pre-
cision. In our opinion, the results of soundness and completeness are significant, all the
more because we want to provide some theoretical foundations to the idea –explored by
[1]– that we can actually do machine ethics via theorem-proving (or model-checking).
To end on a slightly less technical note, we finish this section by addressing some
interesting properties concerning interactions of certain operators in the logic presented:
6|= ⊙[α]ϕ→ ♦Kα[α]ϕ.
‘It is not the case that if the agent objectively ought to do something, then it can
knowingly do it.’ Our solution to Example 3 poses a counterexample, because 〈m2, h1〉
is such that 〈m2, h1〉 |= ⊙[α]W , but 〈m2, h1〉 6|= ♦Kα[α]W , as witnessed by the facts
that 〈m2, h2〉 6|= [α]W and that 〈m3, h4〉 6|= [α]W .
6|= ⊙S [α]ϕ→ ⊙[α]ϕ.
‘It is not the case that if the agent subjectively ought to do something, then it objectively
ought to do it.’ Our solution to Example 2 poses a counterexample, because 〈m2, h1〉 is
such that 〈m2, h1〉 |= ⊙S [α]¬G, but 〈m2, h1〉 6|= ⊙[α]¬G.
6|= ⊙[α]ϕ→ ⊙S [α]ϕ.
‘It is not the case that if the agent objectively ought to do something, then it subjectively
ought to do it.’ Our solution to Example 3 poses a counterexample, because 〈m2, h1〉 is
such that 〈m2, h1〉 |= ⊙[α]W , but 〈m2, h1〉 6|= ⊙S [α]W .
5 Conclusion
This work deals with important questions in the modeling of agency, knowledge, and
obligation. Formal depictions of such concepts are likely to be useful when it comes
to doing machine ethics based on deontic logic and its mechanization. The approach
discussed and analyzed here is based on a stit logic of utilitarian ‘ought-to-do’ en-
riched with epistemic relations. We argue that to solve certain problems in the treatment
of knowledge and obligations within stit –namely Horty’s puzzles– one possibility is
to distinguish between objective and subjective versions of the ought-to-do modality.
Moreover, we show that this possibility comes with formal advantages such as simplic-
ity of semantics and axiomatizability.
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A Proof of Soundness
Proposition 2. The system Λ is sound with respect to the class of epistemic utilitarian
bi-valued BT-models.
Proof. LetM = 〈T,⊏,Choice, {∼α}α∈Ags,ValueO,ValueS〉 be an epistemic util-
itarian bi-valued BT-frame. Let V be any pertinent valuation function. The S5 axioms
for , [α], Kα, as well as axioms (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5), (A6), (Oic), (IA),
(OAC), and (Unif −H) are shown to be semantic validities straightforwardly. Since
they involve some novelty, we include the detailed proofs for (s.N), (s.Oic), and (Cl)
here.
– To see that M  (s.N), take 〈m∗, h∗〉 such that 〈m∗, h∗〉 |= Kαϕ. Let m be
such that m∗ ∼α m (which means that there exist j ∈ Hm∗ , j
′ ∈ Hm such
that 〈m∗, j〉 ∼α 〈m, j
′〉), and let L ∈ Choicem∗α . Condition (Unif− H) ensures
that there exists h′∗ ∈ Hm such that 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α 〈m,h
′
∗〉. Our assumption that
〈m∗, h∗〉 |= Kαϕ implies then that 〈m,h′∗〉 |= ϕ. Therefore, for any h ∈ [L]
m
α ,
the fact that h ∈ Hm yields that 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ. Therefore, for every L ∈ Choice
m∗
α
and every m such that m∗ ∼α m , we have that [L]mα ⊆ |ϕ|
m, which vacuously
implies that 〈m∗, h∗〉 |= ⊙S [α]ϕ.
– To see that M  (s.Oic), take 〈m∗, h∗〉 such that 〈m∗, h∗〉 |= ⊙S [α]ϕ. This
implies that there exists L∗ ⊆ Hm∗ such that [L∗]
m′
α ⊆ |ϕ|
m′ for every m′ ∈ T
such that m∗ ∼α m′. Since ∼α is reflexive, it is clear that [L∗]m∗α ⊆ |ϕ|
m∗ . Now,
take h0 ∈ L∗. Let 〈m,h〉 be such that 〈m∗, h0〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉. From the definition of
the epistemic cluster set, we have that h ∈ [L∗]mα , so that [L∗]
m
α ⊆ |ϕ|
m and thus
〈m,h〉 |= ϕ. Therefore, we have that h0 ∈ Hm∗ is such that for every 〈m,h〉 with
〈m∗, h0〉 ∼α 〈m,h〉, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ. This means that 〈m∗, h0〉 |= Kαϕ. Therefore,
we have that 〈m∗, h∗〉 |= ♦Kαϕ.
– To see that M  (Cl), take 〈m∗, h∗〉 such that 〈m∗, h∗〉 |= ⊙S [α]ϕ. Let 〈m, j〉
be such that 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α 〈m, j〉. Take h ∈ Hm. We want to show that for ev-
ery L ∈ Choicemα such that [L]
m′ 6⊆ |ϕ|m
′
(for some m′ such that m ∼α
m′), there exists L′ ∈ Choicemα such that L ≺s L
′ and if L′′ = L′ or L′ s
L′′, then for everym′′ such thatm ∼α m′′, we have that [L′′]m
′′
α ⊆ |ϕ|
m′′ . Take
L ∈ Choicemα such that there exists m
′ ∈ T with m ∼α m′ and [L]m
′
6⊆ |ϕ|m
′
.
Let NL be an action in Choice
m∗
α such that NL ⊆ [L]
m∗
α . We know that such
an action exists, in virtue of (Unif− H) and (OAC). Notice that transitivity of ∼α
entails that [NL]
o
α = [L]
o
α for any moment o, so we have that [NL]
m′
α 6⊆ |ϕ|
m′ .
Since 〈m∗, h∗〉 |= ⊙S [α]ϕ, we get that there must exist N ∈ Choice
m∗
α such
that NL ≺s N and if N ′ = N or N s N ′, then for everym′′ such thatm∗ ∼α
m′′, [N ′]m
′′
α ⊆ |ϕ|
m′′ . Now, let LN be an action in Choice
m
α such that LN ⊆
[N ]mα (which implies that [LN ]
o
α = [N ]
o
α for any moment o). We claim that L ≺s
LN , and show our claim with the following argument. Let m
′′ be a moment such
that m ∼α m′′, and let S ∈ State
m′′
α . On one hand, we have that ⋆ [L]
m′′
α ∩ S =
[NL]
m′′
α ∩ S ≤s [N ]
m′′
α ∩ S = [LN ]
m′′
α ∩ S. On the other hand, we know that
there exists a momentm′′′ such thatm∗ ∼α m′′′ and a state S0 ∈ State
m′′′
α such
that [N ]m
′′′
α ∩ S0 6≤s [NL]
m′′′
α ∩ S0. Therefore, we have that (⋆) [LN ]
m′′′
α ∩ S0 =
[N ]m
′′′
α ∩ S0 6≤s [NL]
m′′′
α ∩ S0 = [L]
m′′′
α ∩ S0. Together, (⋆) and (⋆⋆) entail
that L ≺s LN . Now, let L′′ ∈ Choice
m
α such that L
′′ = LN or LN s L′′. If
L′′ = LN , then for every m
′′ such that m ∼α m
′′, [L′′]m
′′
α = [N ]
m′′
α ⊆ |ϕ|
m′′ .
If LN ≺s L′′, then an argument similar to the the one we used above to show that
our claim was true renders that an action NL′′ ∈ Choice
m∗
α with NL′′ ⊆ [L
′′]m∗α
is such that N s NL′′ , so that [L′′]m
′′
α = [NL′′ ]
m′′
α ⊆ |ϕ|
m′′ . With this, we have
shown that 〈m,h〉 |= ⊙S [α]ϕ. Since this happens for every h ∈ Hm, we have that
〈m, j〉 |=  ⊙S [α]ϕ. Since this happens for any 〈m, j〉 such that 〈m∗, h∗〉 ∼α
〈m, j〉, then we get that 〈m∗, h∗〉 |= Kα⊙S [α]ϕ.
– Modus Ponens, Substitution, and Necessitation for preserve validity.
Therefore, we have shown that the system Λ is sound with respect to the class of epis-
temic bi-valued BT-models.
B Proof of Completeness
Definition 5 (Kripke-estit frames).
A tuple F = 〈W,R, Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags, ValueO, ValueS〉 is called a Kripke-
estit frame iffW is a set of possible worlds and
1. R is an equivalence relation over W . For w ∈ W , the class of w under R is
denoted by w.
2. Choice is a function that assigns to each α ∈ Ags and each -class w (with
w ∈ W ) a partition Choicewα of w given by an equivalence relation which we will
denote by Rwα . Choice must satisfy the following constraint:
– (IA)K Forw ∈W , we have that each function s : Ags→ P(w) that maps α to
a member of Choicewα is such that
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅ (the set of all functions s
that map α to a member of Choicewα is denoted by Select
m).
For w ∈ W and v ∈ w, the class of v in the partition Choicewα is denoted by
Choicewα (v). For w ∈ W and β ∈ Ags, we define State
w
β = {S ⊆ w;S =⋂
α∈Ags−{β} s(α), where s ∈ Select
m}.
3. For each α ∈ Ags, ≈α is an (epistemic) equivalence relation on W that satisfies
the following constraints:
– (OAC)K For w ∈ W such that v ∈ w, if v ≈α u, then v′ ≈α u for every
v′ ∈ Choicewα (v).
– (Unif− H)K Let w1, w2 ∈ W such that there exist v ∈ w1 and u ∈ w2 with
v ≈α u. Then for every v
′ ∈ w1, there exists u
′ ∈ w2 such that v
′ ≈α u
′.
For each v ∈ W such that w ∼α v, we define the epistemic cluster set of L at v by
[[L]]vα := {u ∈ v; ∃o ∈ L such that o ≈α u}.
4. ValueO and ValueS are (utilitarian) deontic functions that assign to each w ∈W
a value in R. We use them to define objective and subjective orderings just as for
BT-models.
Kripke-estit frames allow us to evaluate the formulas of LKO in an analogous fash-
ion to the semantics provided for BT-frames. Therefore, we use the name ‘Kripke-estit
models’ for the structures that result from adding a valuation function to Kripke-estit
frames, where the semantics for the formulas of LKO is defined so as to mirror Defini-
tion 3. Kripke-estit models can be used for constructing epistemic utilitarian bi-valued
BT-models such that both satisfy the same formulas of LKO:
Definition 6 (Associated BT-frame).
Let F = 〈W,R, Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags, ValueO, ValueS〉 be a Kripke-estit frame.
We define the tuple 〈TW ,⊏,Choice, {∼α}α∈Ags,ValueO,ValueS〉 will be called
the epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-frame associated to F such that
1. TW := W ∪{w;w ∈W}∪{W} and⊏ is a relation on TW such that⊏ is defined
as the transitive closure of the union {(w, v);w ∈ W and v ∈ w} ∪ {(W,w);w ∈
W}. Notice that ⊏ is a strict partial order on TW that satisfies “no backward
branching” straightforwardly. Since the tuple 〈TW ,⊏〉 is thus a tree, we can call the
maximal ⊏-chains in TW histories. We observe that the definition of ⊏ yields that
there is a bijective correspondence between the set of worlds inW and the histories
of TW . If for each v ∈ W , we set hv to be the history {W, v, v}, then we have that
for any world o ∈ W , o ∈ hv iff o = v. Therefore, we will conveniently identify
these histories using the worlds at their terminal nodes. In this line of thought, we
have that for each w ∈ W , the set Hw of histories running through w is equal to
the set {hv; v ∈ w} –since w ∈ hv iff v ∈ w. Similarly, we have that the set H of
all histories is the same as {hv; v ∈W}.
2. Choice is an agentive choice function for the tree of the above item. In order
to define such a function, we use the partitions Choicewα (where w ∈ W and
α ∈ Ags) in the following manner: for each B ∈ P(W ), we will write BT to
denote the set {hv; v ∈ B}; this way, we define a functionChoice on Ags× TW
with extension given by Choice(α, v) = {{hv}} for each α ∈ Ags and v ∈ W ,
Choice(α,w) = {CTα ;Cα ∈ Choice
w
α} for each w ∈ W and each α ∈ Ags, and
Choice(α,W ) = {H} for each α ∈ Ags. To keep notation consistent, we will
denote sets of the form Choice(α,w) by Choicewα , so that the choice-class of a
given hv in Choice
w
α is denoted by Choice
w
α (hv), as expected.
11 It is important
to mention that this definition yields that for every S ∈ Statewα , S
T ∈ Statewα ,
and that for each U ∈ Statewα , there exists V ∈ State
w
α such that U = V
T .
3. For each α ∈ Ags, we define an epistemic relation ∼α on TW using the set {≈α
}α∈Ags. For a given agent α ∈ Ags, we define∼α= {(〈w, hv〉, 〈w′, hv′〉);w,w′ ∈
W and v ≈α v′}∪{(〈z, hz〉, 〈z, hz〉); z ∈ W}∪{(〈W,hv〉, 〈W,hv′〉); v, v′ ∈ W}.
We observe, then, that this definition entails that ∼α is an equivalence relation for
every α ∈ Ags and that, for a given w ∈ W and L ∈ Choicewα , v ∈ [[L]]
w
α iff
hv ∈ [LT ]wα .
4. ValueO and ValueS are two utilitarian deontic functions, defined such that for
each hv ∈ H , ValueO(hv) = ValueO(v) and ValueS(hv) = ValueS(v). En-
dowed with these deontic functions, we can define objective and subjective domi-
nance orderings for this structure accordingly.
Proposition 3. LetF = 〈W,R, Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags, ValueO, ValueS〉 be a Kripke-
estit frame. The tuple 〈TW ,⊏,Choice, {∼α}α∈Ags,ValueO,ValueS〉 is an epis-
temic utilitarian bi-valued BT-frame.
11 Notice that this implies that, for two worlds v, v′ in w, vRwαv
′ iff hv ∈ Choice
w
α (hv′).
Proof. It amounts to showing that the tuple, as defined, validates the semantic condi-
tions (NC), (IA), (OAC), and (Unif− H).
– (NC) is vacuously validated in moment W . It is validated in moments of the form
w (w ∈W ), since two different histories never intersect in a moment later than w).
Finally, it is also validated in moments of the form v such that v ∈ W (since there
are no moments above v).
– For (IA), we reason by cases:
a) At moment W , (IA) is validated straightforwardly, since Choice(α,W ) =
{H} for each α ∈ Ags.
b) For a fixed moment of the form w (with w ∈ W ), let s be a function that
assigns to each agent α a member of Choicewα = {(Cα)
T ;Cα ∈ Choice
w
α}.
Let sk : Ags →
⋃
α∈Ags Choice
w
α be a function such that sk(α) = Cα iff
s(α) = (Cα)
T . Since M validates the constraint (IA)K , then we have that⋂
α∈Ags sk(α) 6= ∅. Take v ∈
⋂
α∈Ags sk(α). Then v ∈ Cα for every α ∈
Ags. This implies that hv ∈ (Cα)
T for everyα ∈ Ags, so that
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6=
∅.
c) At moments of the form v such that v ∈ W , if s is a function that assigns to
each agent α a member ofChoice(v, α), we have that s must be constant and⋂
α∈Ags s(α) = {hv}.
– For (OAC), again we reason by cases:
a) Assume that 〈w, hv〉 ∼α 〈w′, hv′〉 (for w,w′ ∈ W ). This means that v ≈α v′.
We want to show that for every hu ∈ Choice
w
α such that hu ∈ Choice
w
α (hv),
〈w, hu〉 ∼α 〈w′, hv′〉. Therefore, let hu ∈ Choice
w
α (hv). By definition, we
have that this means that u ∈ Choicewα (v). SinceM validates the constraint
(OAC)K , this last fact implies, with v ≈α v′, that u ≈α v′, which in turn yields
that 〈w, hu〉 ∼α 〈w′, hv〉.
b) For situations with moments of the form v such that v ∈ W , we have that
(OAC) is met straightforwardly, since for hv, the choice-cell in Choice(α, v)
to which hv belongs is just {hv}.
c) For situations with momentW , (OAC) is also met straightforwardly, since for
every α ∈ Ags, ∼α is defined such that 〈W,hv〉 ∼α 〈W,hv′〉 for every pair of
histories hv, hv′ inH .
– For (Unif− H), again we reason by cases:
a) Assume that 〈w, hv〉 ∼α 〈w′, hv′〉 (for w,w′ ∈ W ). This means that v ∈ w,
v′ ∈ w′, and v ≈α v′. Let hz ∈ Hw (which means that z ∈ w). We want
to show that there exists h ∈ Hw′ such that 〈w, hz〉 ∼α 〈w
′, h〉. Condition
(Unif −H)K gives us that there exists z′ ∈ w′ such that z ≈α z′, which by
definiton of ∼α means that 〈w, hz〉 ∼α 〈w′, hz′〉.
b) For situations with moments of the form v such that v ∈ W , we have that
〈v, hv〉 is∼α-related only to itself, so that (Unif− H) is met straightforwardly.
c) For situations with momentW , (Unif− H) is also met straightforwardly, since
〈W,hv〉 ∼α 〈W,hv′〉 for every v, v′ ∈ W .
LetM be a Kripke-estit model with valuation functionV . The frame uponwhichM
is based has an associated BT-frame. If to the tuple of this BT-frame we add a valuation
function VT such that VT (p) = {〈w, hw〉;w ∈ V(p)}, we call the resulting model the
epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-model associated toM.
Proposition 4. Let M be a Kripke-estit model, and let Mt denote its associated BT-
model. For a formula ϕ ofLKO andw ∈W , we have thatM, w  ϕ iffM
T , 〈w, hw〉 
ϕ.
Proof. Claim 1. For a given Kripke-estit modelM and a fixed w ∈ WΛ, we have that
for every L,N ∈ Choicewα ,
– L  N iff LT  NT and L ≺ N iff LT ≺ NT .
– L s N iff L
T s N
T and L ≺s N iff L
T ≺s N
T .
– L ∈ Optimalwα iffL
T ∈ Optimalwα , andL ∈ S− Optimal
w
α iffL
T ∈ S−Optimalwα .
We will prove Claim 1.only for the strict orderings, since these proofs include the ar-
guments needed to show that the statements for  and s also hold.
– (⇒) We assume that L ≺ N . Let U ∈ Statewα . We know that U = V
T for
some V ∈ Statewα . Therefore, we have that L ∩ V ≤ N ∩ V . But notice that,
by definition, we have that for each v ∈ w, ValueO(hv) = ValueO(v), so the
fact that L ∩ V ≤ N ∩ V implies that LT ∩ U ≤ NT ∩ U . Now, our assumption
also yields that there should exist S0 ∈ Statewα such that N ∩ S0  L ∩ S0. This
straightforwardly implies that NT ∩ ST0  L
T ∩ ST0 , so that indeed we have that
LT ≺ NT .
(⇐) We assume that LT ≺ NT . Let S ∈ Statewα . We know that L
T ∩ ST ≤
NT ∩ ST , so that L ∩ S ≤ N ∩ S. Similarly, here our assumption yields that
there should exist U0 ∈ State
w
α such that N
T ∩ U0  LT ∩ U0. But we have that
U0 = V
T
0 for some V0 ∈ State
w
α , so that the definition of ValueO implies that
N ∩ V0  L ∩ V0. With this, we have shown that L ≺ N .
– (⇒)We assume that L ≺s N . Let w′ be such that w ≈α w′, and let U ∈ State
w′
α .
We know that U = V T for some V ∈ Statew
′
α . Therefore, we have that [[L]]
w′
α ∩
V ≤s [[N ]]w
′
α ∩ V . We have that for each w ∈ W , ValueS(hw) = ValueS(w),
and that for each pair v1, v2 such that v1 ∈ [[L]]w
′
α ∩ V and v2 ∈ [[N ]]
w′
α ∩ V , then
hv1 ∈ [L
T ]w
′
α ∩ V
T and hv2 ∈ [N
T ]w
′
α ∩ V
T , so that the fact that [[L]]w
′
α ∩ V ≤s
[[N ]]w
′
α ∩ V then implies that [L
T ]w
′
α ∩ U ≤s [N ]
w′
α ∩ U . Now, our assumption
also yields that there should exist w∗ such that w ≈α w∗ and S0 ∈ Statew∗α such
that [[N ]]w∗α ∩ S
T
0 s [[L]]
w∗
α ∩ S
T
0 . Analogously, this implies that [N
T ]w∗α ∩ S0 s
[LT ]w∗α ∩ S0, so that indeed we have that L
T ≺s NT .
(⇐) We assume that LT ≺s NT . Let w′ be such that w ≈α w′, and let S ∈
Statew
′
α . We know that [L
T ]w
′
α ∩S
T ≤s [NT ]w
′
α ∩S
T , so that an argument similar
to the one displayed for the above item renders that [[L]]w
′
α ∩ S ≤s [[N ]]
w′
α ∩ S. On
the other hand, there should exist w∗ such that w ≈α w∗ and U0 ∈ State
w∗
α such
thatNT ∩U0 s LT ∩U0. But we have that U0 = V T0 for some V0 ∈ State
w∗
α , so
that, in an analogous fashion to what we did above, we get thatN ∩ V0 s L∩ V0.
With this, we have shown that L ≺s N .
– Straightforward from the above items.
With that we conclude the proof of Claim 1. For the proof of the main statement,
we proceed by induction on ϕ. For the base case, we have that, for a propositional
letter p and an arbitrary w ∈ W , M, w  p iff w ∈ V(p) iff 〈w, hw〉 ∈ V
T (p) iff
MT , 〈w, hw〉  p. The cases with the boolean connectives are standard, so let us deal
with the modal operators. Let w ∈W and α ∈ Ags.
– (“”)
We have that M, w  ϕ iff for every v ∈ w, Mw, v  ϕ, which by induc-
tion hypothesis happens iff MT , 〈v, hv〉  ϕ for every v ∈ w, which happens iff
MT , 〈w, hw〉  ϕ, since we have that hv ∈ Hw iff v ∈ w.
– (“[α]”)
We have that M, w  [α]ϕ iff for every v ∈ W such that wRwαv, M, v  ϕ,
which by induction hypothesis happens iff MT , 〈w, hv〉  ϕ for every hv ∈
Choice
w
α (hw), which in turn happens iffM
T , 〈w, hw〉  [α]ϕ.
– (“Kα”)
We have that M, w  Kαϕ iff for every v ∈ W such that w ≈α v, M, v  ϕ,
which by induction hypothesis occurs iffMT , 〈v, hv〉  ϕ for every hv ∈ H such
that 〈w, hw〉 ∼α 〈v, hv〉, which happens iffMT , 〈w, hw〉  Kαϕ.
– (“⊙[α]”)
(⇒) We assume that M, w  ⊙[α]ϕ. Then for every L ∈ Choicewα such that
M, vL 1 ϕ for some vL ∈ L, there existsL′ ∈ Choicewα such that L ≺ L
′ and if L′′ =
L′ or L′  L′′, thenM, v  ϕ for every v ∈ L′′. Let N ∈ Choicewα such
that MT , 〈w, hz〉 2 ϕ for some hz ∈ N . By induction hypothesis, we get that
M, z 1 ϕ. The cell N is LT0 for some L0 ∈ Choice
w
α . Since z ∈ L0 and
M, z 1 ϕ, our assumption entails that there exists L1 ∈ Choicewα such that
L0 ≺ L1 and if L′′ = L1 or L1  L′′ then M, v  ϕ for every v ∈ L′′. We
claim that LT1 is the choice cell at moment w that will witness to the fact that
MT , 〈w, hw〉  ⊙[α]ϕ. In order to show this, we first notice that the first item of
Claim 1 renders that LT0 ≺ L
T
1 . Now, we also have that for every hv ∈ L
T
1 , v ∈ L1
(observe also that v ∈ w and therefore M, v  ϕ; in this way, we have that for
every hv ∈ LT1 , the induction hypothesis gives thatM
T , 〈w, hv〉  ϕ. Finally, let
V T ∈ Choicewα such that L
T
1  V
T . By the first item of Claim 1, this last con-
dition implies that L1  V . Take hv ∈ V T . We know that v ∈ V , so that the fact
that L1  V implies with our assumption thatM, v  ϕ; therefore, the induction
hypothesis gives thatMT , 〈w, hv〉  ϕ. With this, we have shown that our claim is
true and thatMT , 〈w, hw〉  ⊙[α]ϕ.
(⇐) We assume thatMT , 〈w, hw〉  ⊙[α]ϕ. Then for every LT ∈ Choice
w
α such
thatMT , 〈w, hz〉 2 ϕ for some hz ∈ LT , there exists LT1 ∈ Choice
w
α such that
LT ≺T1 and if U = L
T
1 or L
T  U , then MT , 〈w, hu〉  ϕ for every hu ∈ U .
Let N ∈ Choicewα such thatM, v 1 ϕ for some v ∈ N . By induction hypothesis,
we get thatMTW , 〈w, hv〉 2 ϕ. We have that N
T ∈ Choicewα . Therefore, our as-
sumption entails that there exists LT1 ∈ Choice
w
α such thatN
T ≺ LT1 and if U =
LT1 or L
T
1  U, thenM
T , 〈w, hu〉  ϕ for every hu ∈ U . Here, we claim that L1
is the choice cell that will witness to the fact thatM, w  ⊙[α]ϕ. In order to show
this, we first notice that the first item of Claim 1 renders that N ≺ L1. Next, for
every v ∈ L1, hv ∈ LT1 and therefore M
T , 〈w, hv〉  ϕ; in this way, we have
that for every v ∈ L1, the induction hypothesis gives that M, v  ϕ. Finally, let
L ∈ Choicewα such that L1  L. By the first item of Claim 1, this last condition
implies that LT1  L
T . Take v ∈ L. We know that hv ∈ L
T , so that the fact that
LT1  L
T implies with our assumption that MT , 〈w, hv〉  ϕ; therefore, the in-
duction hypothesis gives thatM, v  ϕ. With this, we have shown that our claim
is true and thatMw, w  ⊙[α]ϕ.
– (“⊙S [α]”)
(⇒) We assume that M, w  ⊙S [α]ϕ. Then for every L ∈ Choicewα such that
M, vL 1 ϕ for some vL ∈ [[L]]w
′
α (withw ≈α w
′), there exists L′ ∈ Choicewα such
that L ≺s L′ and if L′′ = L′ or L′ s L′′, then for every w′′ such that w ≈α w′′,
M, v  ϕ for every v ∈ [[L′′]]w
′′
α . Let N ∈ Choice
w
α such thatM
T
W , 〈w
′, hz〉 2
ϕ for some hz ∈ [N ]w
′
α (with w ∼α w
′). By induction hypothesis, we get that
M, z 1 ϕ. The cell N is LT0 for some L0 ∈ Choice
w
α . Moreover, our defini-
tion of ∼α in terms of ≈α entails that z ∈ [[L0]]w
′
α , so that the fact that M, z 1
ϕ entails with our assumption that there exists L1 ∈ Choicewα such that L0 ≺s
L1 and if L
′′ = L1 or L1 s L′′ then for every w′′ such that w ≈α w′′,M, v 
ϕ for every v ∈ [[L′′]]w
′′
α . We claim that L
T
1 is the choice cell at moment w that
will witness to the fact that MT , 〈w, hw〉  ⊙S [α]ϕ. In order to show this, we
first notice that the second item of Claim 1 renders that LT0 ≺s L
T
1 . We also have
that for every w′′ such that w ∼α w′′ and hv ∈ [L
T
1 ]
w′′
α , v ∈ [[L1]]
w′′
α and there-
fore M, v  ϕ; in this way, we have that for every w′′ such that w ∼α w′′ and
every hv ∈ [LT1 ]
w′′
α , the induction hypothesis gives that M
T , (w′′, hv)  ϕ. Fi-
nally, let V T ∈ Choicewα such that L
T
1 s V
T . By the second item of Claim
1 , this last condition implies that L1 s V . Take w′′ such that w ∼α w′′, and
take hv ∈ [V T ]w
′′
α . We know that v ∈ [[V ]]
w′′
α , so that the fact that L1 s V im-
plies with our assumption thatM, v  ϕ; therefore, the induction hypothesis gives
that MT , (w′′, hv)  ϕ. With this, we have shown that our claim is true and that
MT , 〈w, hw〉  ⊙S [α]ϕ.
(⇐) We assume that MT , 〈w, hw〉  ⊙S [α]ϕ. Then for every LT ∈ Choice
w
α
such that MT , 〈w, hz〉 2 ϕ for some hz ∈ [LT ]w
′
α (with w ∼α w
′), there exists
LT1 ∈ Choice
w
α such that L
T ≺s LT1 and if U = L
T
1 or L
T s U , then for
every w′′ such that w ∼α w′′, MT , (w′′, hu)  ϕ for every hu ∈ [U ]w
′′
α . Let
N ∈ Choicewα such that M, v 1 ϕ for some v ∈ [[N ]]
w′
α (with w ≈α w
′). By
induction hypothesis, we get thatMT , 〈w′, hv〉 2 ϕ. The fact thatw ≈α w′ implies
that w ∼α w′. Since hv ∈ [NT ]w
′
α , then, we know that there existsL
T
1 ∈ Choice
w
α
such that NT ≺s LT1 and if U = L
T
1 or L
T
1 s U ,then for every w
′′ such that
w ∼α w′′,MT , (w′′, hu)  ϕ for every hu ∈ [U ]w
′′
α . Here, we claim that L1
is the choice cell that will witness to the fact that M, w  ⊙S [α]ϕ. In order to
show this, we first notice that the second item of Claim 1 renders that N ≺s L1.
Next, for every w′′ such that w ≈α w′′ (which implies that w ∼α w′′) and every
v ∈ [[L1]]w
′′
α , hv ∈ [L
T
1 ]
w′′
α and thereforeM
T , (w′′, hv)  ϕ; in this way, we have
that for every for everyw′′ such thatw ≈α w′′ and every v ∈ [[L1]]w
′′
α , the induction
hypothesis gives thatM, v  ϕ. Finally, let L ∈ Choicewα such that L1 s L. By
the second item of Claim 1 , this last condition implies that LT1 s L
T . Take w′
such that w ≈α w′ (which implies that w ∼α w′), and take v ∈ [[L]]wα . We know
that hv ∈ [LT ]w
′′
α , so that the fact that L
T
1 s L
T implies with our assumption that
MT , (w′′, hv)  ϕ; therefore, the induction hypothesis gives thatM, v  ϕ. With
this, we have shown that our claim is true and thatM, w  ⊙S [α]ϕ.
B.1 Canonical Kripke-estit models
We will show that the proof system Λ is complete with respect to the class of Kripke-
estit models (and thus use Proposition 4 to show completeness with respect to the class
of epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-models). The strategy is to build a canonical struc-
ture from the syntax.
Definition 7 (Canonical Structure). The tuple
M = 〈WΛ, R, Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags, ValueO, ValueS ,V〉
is called a canonical structure for Λ iff
– WΛ = {w;w is a Λ-MCS}.
– R is a relation over W
Λ defined by the following rule: for w, v ∈ WΛ, wRv
iff for every ϕ, ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v. For w ∈ WΛ, the set {v ∈ WΛ;wRv} is
denoted by w.
– Choice is a function that assigns to each α and w a subset of P(w), which will
be denoted by Choicewα and defined as follows: let R
w
α be a relation on w such
that for w, v ∈ WΛ, wRwαv iff for every ϕ, [α]ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v; if we take
Choicewα (v) = {u ∈ w; vR
w
αu}, then we set Choice
w
α =
⋃
v∈w Choice
w
α (v).
– For each α ∈ Ags,≈α is an epistemic relation onWΛ given by the following rule:
for w, v ∈WΛ, w ≈α v iff for every ϕ, Kαϕ ∈ w⇒ ϕ ∈ v.
– ValueO and ValueS are defined as follows. For α ∈ Ags and w ∈ WΛ, we first
define two sets:
Σwα = {[α]ϕ;⊙[α]ϕ ∈ w}
Γwα = {Kαϕ;⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ w}.
If we take Σw =
⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α and Γ
w =
⋃
α∈Ags Γ
w
α , then we define the deontic
functions by
ValueO(w) =
{
1 iff Σw ⊆ w
0 otherwise.
ValueS(w) =
{
1 iff Γw ⊆ w
0 otherwise.
– V is the canonical valuation, defined such that w ∈ V(p) iff p ∈ w.
Proposition 5. The canonical structureM for Λ is a Kripke-estit model.
Proof. We need to show that the tuple 〈WΛ, R, Choice, {≈α}α∈Ags, ValueO, ValueS〉
is a Kripke-estit frame, which amounts to showing that the tuple validates the five items
in the definition of Krioke-estir models.
1. It is clear thatR is an equivalence relation, since Λ includes the S5 axioms for.
2. Since Λ includes the S5 axioms for [α] (for each α ∈ Ags), we have that Rwα
is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags and w ∈ WΛ. Moreover, since Λ
includes p → [α]p as an axiom schema, we have that Rα ⊆ R. In this way,
Choice indeed assigns to each α and w a partition of w. Now, we must verify that
M validates the constraint (IA)K . In order to do that, we need two intermediate
results:
a) For a fixed w∗ ∈WΛ, we have that w ∈ w∗ iff {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} ⊆ w.
(⇒) Let w ∈ w∗ (which means that w∗Rw). Take ϕ a formula of LKO such
that ϕ ∈ w∗. Since w∗ is closed under Modus Ponens, the (4) axiom for 
implies thatϕ ∈ w∗ as well. Therefore, by the definition of R, we get that
ϕ ∈ w.
(⇐) We assume that {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} ⊆ w. Take ϕ a formula of LKO such that
ϕ ∈ w∗. By our assumption, we get that ϕ ∈ W . Since w is closed under
Modus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for implies that ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we
have that the fact that ϕ ∈ w∗ implies that ϕ ∈ w, which means that w∗Rw
and w ∈ w∗.
b) For a fixedw∗ ∈WΛ and s : Ags→ P(w∗) a function that mapsα to a member
of Choicew∗α such that vs(α) ∈ s(α), we have that w ∈ s(α) iff ∆s(α) =
{[α]ψ; [α]ψ ∈ vs(α)} ⊆ w.
(⇒) Let w ∈ s(α) (which means that vs(α)R
w∗
α w). Take ϕ a formula of LKO
such that [α]ϕ ∈ vs(α). Since vs(α) is closed underModus Ponens, the (4) axiom
for [α] implies that [α][α]ϕ ∈ vs(α) as well. Therefore, by definition of R
w∗
α ,
we get that [α]ϕ ∈ w.
(⇐) We assume that ∆s(α) = {[α]ψ; [α]ψ ∈ vs(α)} ⊆ w. Take ϕ a formula of
LKO such that [α]ϕ ∈ vs(α). By our assumption, we get that [α]ϕ ∈ w. Since
w is closed under Modus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for [α] implies that ϕ ∈ w as
well. In this way, we have that the fact that [α]ϕ ∈ vs(α) implies that ϕ ∈ w,
which means that vs(α)R
w∗
α w and w ∈ s(α).
Next, we will show that for a fixed w∗ ∈ WΛ and s : Ags → P(w∗) a function
that maps α to a member of Choicew∗α such as in item b) above, we have that⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} is Λ-consistent.
First, we will show that
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is consistent. Suppose that this is not the
case. Then there exists a set {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} of formulas of LKO such that [αi]ϕi ∈
vs(αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn)→ ⊥. (1)
Without loss of generality, we assume that αi 6= αj for all j 6= i such that j, i ∈
{1, . . . , n} –this assumption hinges on the fact that any stit operator distributes over
conjunction. Notice that the fact that [αi]ϕi ∈ vs(αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n implies
that ♦[αi] ∈ w∗ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since w∗ is closed under conjunction, we
also have that ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn ∈ w∗.
By the independence-of-agents axiom, we have that
⊢ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn → ♦([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn). (2)
Therefore, equations (2) and (1), imply that
⊢ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn → ♦⊥. (3)
But this is a contradiction, since we had seen that ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn ∈ w∗,
and w∗ is a Λ-MCS. Therefore,
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is consistent.
Next, we show that the union
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} is also consistent.
Suppose that this is not the case. Since
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is consistent, there must exist
sets {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and {θ1, . . . , θm} of formulas of LKO such that [αi]ϕi ∈ vs(αi)
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, θi ∈ w∗ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn) ∧ (θ1 ∧ · · · ∧θm)→ ⊥. (4)
Let θ = θ1 ∧ · · · ∧ θm. Since  distributes over conjunction, we have that θ =
θ1 ∧ · · · ∧θm, where it is important to mention that since w∗ is a Λ-MCS, then
θ ∈ w∗. In these terms, (4) implies that
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn)→ ¬θ. (5)
Once again, we assume without loss of generality that αi 6= αj for all j 6= i
such that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Analogous to the procedure we used to show that⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) is consistent, (5) implies that
⊢ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn → ♦¬θ. (6)
This entails that♦¬θ ∈ w∗, but this is a contradiction, since the fact thatθ ∈ w∗
implies with the (4) axiom for  that θ ∈ w∗.
Now, let u∗ be the Λ-MCS that includes
⋃
α∈Ags∆s(α) ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗}. By the
intermediate result a), it is clear that u∗ ∈ w∗. By the intermediate result b), it is
clear that u∗ ∈ s(α) for every α ∈ Ags. Therefore, we have shown that for a fixed
w∗ ∈ W , we have that each function s : Ags → P(w∗) that maps α to a member
of Choicew∗α is such that
⋂
α∈Ags s(α) 6= ∅, which means that M validates the
constraint (IA)K .
3. Since the axiom system Λ includes the S5 axioms for Kα for each α ∈ Ags, we
have that≈α is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags. We must now verify that
M validates the constraints (OAC)K and (Unif− H)K .
i) For (OAC)K , fix w∗ ∈ WΛ and α ∈ Ags. We assume that v, u ∈ w∗ are such
that v ≈α u. Let v′ ∈ Choice
w∗
α (v). This means that vRαv
′. We want to show
that v′ ≈α u, so let ϕ be a formula of LKO such that Kαϕ ∈ v
′. By the (4)
axiom for Kα, we have that KαKαϕ ∈ v′. Similarly, since all substitutions
of the (OAC) axiom lie within v′ and it is closed under Modus Ponens, we
get that [α]Kαϕ also lies in v
′. Since v′Rαv, this implies that Kαϕ ∈ v.
Therefore, our assumption that v ≈α u entails that ϕ ∈ u. With this, we have
shown that the fact that Kαϕ ∈ v′ implies that ϕ ∈ u, which means that
v′ ≈α u.
ii) For (Unif− H)K , fix w1, w2 ∈ WΛ. We assume that there exist v ∈ w1 and
u ∈ w2 such that v ≈α u. Take v′ ∈ w1.
We will show that u′′ = {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ u} is consistent. In
order to do so, we will first show that {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} is consistent. Suppose
for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Then there exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn}
of formulas of LKO such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v
′} and ⊢ ψ1∧· · ·∧
ψn → ⊥ (a). Now, the fact that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} means that
Kαψi ∈ v′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; by necessitation of Kα and its distributivity
over conjunction, we get that (a) implies that ⊢ Kαψ1 ∧· · · ∧Kαψn → Kα⊥,
but this is a contradiction, since v′ is a Λ-MCS which, being, includesKαψ1∧
· · · ∧Kαψn.
Next, we show that u′′ = {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ u} is also consistent.
Suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Since {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v′} is
consistent, there must exist sets {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and {θ1, . . . , θm} of formulas of
LKO such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ {ψ;Kαψ ∈ v
′}, θi ∈ w2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤
m, and ⊢ (ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn)∧ (θ1∧· · ·∧θm)→ ⊥ (a). Let θ = θ1∧· · ·∧θm
and ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn. Since  distributes over conjunction, we have that
θ = θ1 ∧ · · · ∧ θm, where it is important to mention that since u is a
Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ u and θ ∈ u as well (⋆). In this way, (a) implies that
⊢ ϕ → ¬θ and thus that ⊢ ♦ϕ → ♦¬θ (b). Now, by necessitation of Kα,
we get that (b) implies that ⊢ Kα♦ϕ → Kα♦¬θ (c). Notice that the facts
that Kαϕi ∈ v′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that Kα distributes over conjunction,
and that v′ is a Λ-MCS imply that Kαϕ = Kαϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kαϕn ∈ v′. The
fact that v′ ∈ w1 = v implies that ♦Kαϕ ∈ v, so that (c) and the facts that
v contains all substitutions of the (Unif − H) axiom and is closed under
Modus Ponens entail that Kα♦ϕ ∈ v. Now, this last inclusion implies, with
our assumption that v ≈α u, that ♦ϕ ∈ u, which by (b) in turn yields that
♦¬θ ∈ u, contradicting (⋆). Therefore, u′′ is consistent.
Finally, let u′ be the Λ-MCS that includes u′′. It is clear from its construction
that u′ ∈ u = w2 and that v′ ≈α u′,
With this, we have shown thatM validates the constraint (Unif− H)K .
4. Both ValueO and ValueS are well defined functions with range within R.
As is usual with canonical structures, our objective is to prove the so-called truth
lemma, which says that for every formula ϕ of LKO and every w ∈ W
Λ, we have
thatMn, w  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w. This is done by induction on ϕ, and the inductive step for
each modal operator requires previous results (such as the important existence lemmas).
In the case of ,Kα, and [α], these previous results are standard (Lemma 1 below).
However, in the case of ⊙[α] and ⊙S [α], the previous results require a lot of work. In
Lemmas 2 and 3 below, we pinpoint the main claims that we need to show the inductive
step of the truth lemma for the ought operators. Each item in these two lemmas is shown
by a series of sub-lemmas, and the reader is advised to carefully go over the full proofs
provided in the supplement to the present work.
Lemma 1 (Existence). LetM be the canonical Kripke-estit model forΛ. Letw ∈ WΛ.
For a given formula ϕ of LKO, the following hold:
1. ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w.
2. [α]ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w such that wRαv.
3. Kαϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈WΛ such that w ≈α v.
Proof. Let w ∈WΛ, and take ϕ a formula of LKO.
1. (⇒) We assume that ϕ ∈ w. If v lies within w, this means that wRv holds.
Therefore, ϕ ∈ v.
(⇐)We work by contraposition. Assume thatϕ /∈ w. We will show that there is a
world in w such that ϕ does not lie within it. For this, let v′ = {ψ;ψ ∈ w}, which
is consistent by virtue of the following argument: suppose for a contradiction that v′
is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of formulas of LKO such that
{ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v′ and ⊢ ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn → ⊥ (a); now, the fact that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆
v′ means that ψi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; due to necessitation of  and its
distributivity over conjunction, we get that (a) implies that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn →
⊥, but this is a contradiction, since w is a Λ-MCS which, being closed under
conjunction, includes ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn. Now, we define v′′ = v′ ∪ {¬ϕ}, and
show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose for a contradiction that it is not
consistent; since v′ is consistent, we have that there exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of
formulas of LKO such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v
′ and ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥,
which then implies that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn → ϕ (b); due to necessitation of and its
distributivity over conjunction, we get that (b) implies that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn →
ϕ (c); but notice that since w is a Λ-MCS, thenψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn ∈ w, so that (c)
and the fact that w is closed underModus Ponens entail thatϕ ∈ w, contradicting
the initial assumption that ϕ /∈ w. Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS that includes v′′.
On one hand, it is clear from its construction that ϕ /∈ v and that wRv. Thus, we
have shown that assuming that ϕ /∈ w implies the existence of a v ∈ w such that
ϕ /∈ v.
2. (⇒) We assume that [α]ϕ ∈ w. Let v ∈ w such that wRαv. The definition of Rα
straightforwardly gives that ϕ ∈ v.
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Assume that [α]ϕ /∈ w. We will show that there
is a world v in w such that wRαv and such that ϕ does not lie within it. For
this, let v′ = {ψ; [α]ψ ∈ w}, which is consistent by a similar argument than
the one introduced in the proof of the above item: suppose for a contradiction
that v′ is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of formulas of LKO
such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v′ and ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ⊥ (a); now, the fact
that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v′ means that [α]ψi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; neces-
sitation of [α] and its distributivity over conjunction yield that (a) implies that
⊢ [α]ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ψn → [α]⊥, but this is a contradiction, since w is a Λ-MCS
which, being closed under conjunction, includes [α]ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ψn. Now, we de-
fine v′′ = v′ ∪ {¬ϕ}, and we show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose
for a contradiction that it is not consistent; since v′ is consistent, we have that there
exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of formulas of LKO such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v
′ and
⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥, which then implies that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ϕ (b);
due to necessitation of [α] and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (b)
implies that ⊢ [α]ψ1 ∧· · · ∧ [α]ψn → [α]ϕ (b); but notice that since w is a Λ-MCS,
then [α]ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ψn ∈ w, so that (b) and the fact that w is closed underModus
Ponens entail that [α]ϕ ∈ w, contradicting the initial assumption that [α]ϕ /∈ w.
Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS that includes v′′. On one hand, it is clear from its con-
struction that ϕ /∈ v and that wRαv, by definition of Rα. On the other, axiom (A2)
renders that actually v ∈ w (if θ ∈ w, then [α]θ ∈ w and thus θ ∈ v). Therefore,
we have shown that assuming that [α]ϕ /∈ w implies the existence of a v ∈ w such
that wRαv and ϕ /∈ v.
3. (⇒) We assume that Kαϕ ∈ w. Let v ∈ WΛ such that w ≈α v. The definition of
≈α straightforwardly gives that ϕ ∈ v.
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Assume that Kαϕ /∈ w. We will show that there
is a world v in WΛ such that w ≈α v and such that ϕ does not lie within it.
For this, let v′ = {ψ;Kαψ ∈ w}, which is consistent by an argument similar to
the one introduced in the proofs of the above items: suppose for a contradiction
that v′ is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of formulas of LKO
such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v′ and ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ⊥ (a); now, the fact that
{ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v′ means that Kαψi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; necessitation of
Kα and its distributivity over conjunction yield that (a) implies that ⊢ Kαψ1∧· · ·∧
Kαψn → Kα⊥, but this is a contradiction, sincew is aΛ-MCSwhich, being closed
under conjunction, includesKαψ1 ∧ · · · ∧Kαψn. Now, we define v′′ = v′ ∪{¬ϕ}
v′′ = v′ ∪ {¬ϕ}, and we show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose for
a contradiction that it is not consistent; since v′ is consistent, we have that there
exists a set {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of formulas of LKO such that {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ v
′ and
⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥, which then implies that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ϕ
(b); due to necessitation of Kα and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that
(b) implies that ⊢ Kαψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kαψn → Kαϕ (b); but notice that since w is a
Λ-MCS, then Kαψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kαψn ∈ w, so that (b) and the fact that w is closed
underModus Ponens entail thatKαϕ ∈ w, contradicting the initial assumption that
Kαϕ /∈ w. Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS that includes v′′. On one hand, it is clear
from its construction that ϕ /∈ v and that w ≈α v, by definition of ≈α. Thus, we
have shown that assuming thatKαϕ /∈ w implies the existence of a v ∈ WΛ such
that w ≈α v and ϕ /∈ v.
Lemma 2 (Existence for objective ought). Fix α ∈ Ags and w ∈ WΛ.
(a) For every formula ϕ of LKO, ⊙[α]ϕ ∈ w iff [α]ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w ⊆ W
Λ such
that Σwα ⊆ v.
(b) For every v ∈ Choicewα (w), Σ
w
α ⊆ w iff Σ
w
α ⊆ v
(c) Σwα ⊆ w iff Choice
w
α (w) ∈ Optimal
w
α .
(d) For each L ∈ Choicewα − Optimal
w
α , there exists L
′ ∈ Optimalwα such that L ≺
L′. Thus,M, w  ⊙[α]ϕ iff ∀L ∈ Optimalwα ,M, v  ϕ for every v ∈ L.
Proof. (a) Claim 1. Let M be the canonical Kripke-estit model for Λ. We have that
the following hold:
– For w∗ ∈WΛ, w ∈ w∗ iff {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} ⊆ w.
– For any pair of agents α, α ∈ Ags and any formula ϕ of LKO, ⊙[α]ϕ → ¬⊙
[α]¬ϕ ∈ w for every w ∈ WΛ. We will refer to this property as “consistency
of ought-to-do”.
The proof of the first item goes as follows: (⇒) Let w ∈ w∗ (which means that
w∗Rw). Take ϕ a formula of LKO such that ϕ ∈ w∗. Since w∗ is closed under
Modus Ponens, the (4) axiom for implies that ϕ ∈ w∗ as well. Therefore, by
definition ofR, we get thatϕ ∈ w. (⇐)We assume that {ψ;ψ ∈ w∗} ⊆ w.
Take ϕ a formula of LKO such that ϕ ∈ w∗. By our assumption, we get that
ϕ ∈ W . Since w is closed underModus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for implies that
ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we have that the fact thatϕ ∈ w∗ implies that ϕ ∈ w,
which means that w∗Rw and w ∈ w∗.
The proof of the second item is a direct consequence from the fact that, for α, β ∈
Ags and ϕ a formula of LKO, we have that ⊢ ⊙[α]ϕ → ¬ ⊙ [β]¬ϕ. This comes
from the fact that, for α, β ∈ Ags, ⊢ ⊙[α]ϕ ∧ ⊙[β]¬ϕ → ⊥ –which can be seen
by applying axioms (Oic), (IA), and axiom (T ) for [α] and [β].
Now we proceed with the proof of the main statement.
(⇒) The definition of Σwα implies straightforwardly that [α]ϕ ∈ v.
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Suppose that ⊙[α]ϕ /∈ w.
– We first show that Σwα is consistent. Suppose that Σ
w
α is not consistent. Then
there is a set {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} of formulas of LKO such that⊙[α]ϕi ∈ w for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n and ⊢ ([α]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ϕn) → ⊥. This last thing implies that
⊢ ([α]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ϕn−1)→ ¬[α]ϕn, so that if we take ψ = ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn−1,
then distributivity of [α] over conjunction gives us that ⊢ [α]ψ → ¬[α]ϕn. By
necessitation of the ought-to-do operator and its axiom (K), we get that
⊢ ⊙[α]([α]ψ)→ ⊙[α](¬[α]ϕn). (7)
First, we notice that since w is a Λ-MCS, then ⊙[α]ψ ∈ w (by distributivity
of ⊙[α] over conjunction). The fact that ⊙[α]ψ ∈ w implies with axiom (A4)
that⊙[α]([α]ψ) ∈ w, which with equation (7) implies that⊙[α](¬[α]ϕn) ∈ w.
However, the fact that ⊙[α]ϕn ∈ w implies that ⊙[α]([α]ϕn) ∈ w. Thus, we
both have that ⊙[α](¬[α]ϕn) ∈ w and that ⊙[α]([α]ϕn) ∈ w, which is a
contradiction (by consistency of ought-to-do).
– Next, we observe that the union Σwα ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w} is also consistent. Sup-
pose that Σwα ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w} is not consistent. Since Σ
w
α is consistent, we
have that there must exist sets {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and {θ1, . . . , θm} of formulas of
LKO such that⊙[α]ϕi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,θi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
and
⊢ ([α]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ϕn) ∧ (θ1 ∧ · · · ∧θm)→ ⊥. (8)
Let θ = θ1∧· · ·∧θm. Since distributes over conjunction, we have thatθ =
θ1∧· · ·∧θm, where it is important to mention that sincew is aΛ-MCS, then
θ ∈ w. In these terms, (8) implies that ⊢ ([α]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ϕn) → ¬θ. By
necessitation of the ought-to-do operator, its axiom (K), and its distributivity
over conjunction, we get that
⊢ (⊙[α]([α]ϕ1) ∧ · · · ∧ ⊙[α]([α]ϕn))→ ⊙[α](¬θ). (9)
We have that ⊙[α]([α]ϕi) ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, their con-
junction also lies in w, which by (9) entails that ⊙[α](¬θ) ∈ w. However,
we had also observed that θ ∈ w, which by axiom (4) for  implies that
θ ∈ w and therefore that ⊙[α](θ) ∈ w. We have struck a contradiction,
since we cannot have that both⊙[α](¬θ) and⊙[α](θ) lie in w (consistency
of ought-to-do). Therefore,Σwα ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w} is consistent.
– Finally, we observe that the union Σwα ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w} ∪ {¬[α]ϕ} is also
consistent:
First, recall that we are assuming that ⊙[α]ϕ /∈ w. Now, suppose that Σwα ∪
{ψ;ψ ∈ w} ∪ {¬[α]ϕ} is not consistent. Since Σwα ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w} is
consistent, then there must exist sets {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and {θ1, . . . , θm} of for-
mulas of LKO such that ⊙[α]ϕi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, θi ∈ w for every
1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
⊢ ([α]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ϕn) ∧ (θ1 ∧ · · · ∧θm) ∧ ¬[α]ϕ→ ⊥. (10)
Let θ = θ1 ∧ · · · ∧ θm. Since  distributes over conjunction, we have that
θ ∈ w. Now, (10) implies that
⊢ ([α]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [α]ϕn) ∧θ → [α]ϕ. (11)
By necessitation of the ought-to-do operator, its axiom (K), and its distributiv-
ity over conjunction, we get that
⊢ (⊙[α]([α]ϕ1) ∧ · · · ∧ ⊙[α]([α]ϕn)) ∧ ⊙[α](θ) → ⊙[α]([α]ϕ). (12)
Similarly as above, we have that⊙[α]([α]ϕi) ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. There-
fore, their conjunction also lies in w. At the same time, θ ∈ w implies that
θ ∈ w (by axiom (4) for ), and therefore that ⊙[α](θ) ∈ w. There-
fore, (12) entails that⊙[α]([α]ϕ) ∈ w. But axiom (T ) for [α], necessitation for
the ought-to-do operator, and (K) for the ought-to-do operator then imply that
⊙[α]ϕ ∈ w, and this contradicts the previously shown fact that ⊙[α]ϕ /∈ w.
Let u be the Λ-MCS that includes Σwα ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w} ∪ ¬[α]ϕ. It is clear that
u ∈ w (by the first item of Claim 1), that Σwα ⊆ u, and that [α]ϕ /∈ u.
(b) (⇒) Assume that Σwα ⊆ w, and let [α]ϕ ∈ Σ
w
α . By assumption, we have that
[α]ϕ ∈ w. Since w is a Λ-MCS, axiom (4) for [α] implies that [α]([α]ϕ) ∈ w as
well. With the fact that wRwαv, this implies that [α]ϕ ∈ v. Therefore Σ
w
α ⊆ v for
every v ∈ Choiceα(w).
(⇐) Analogous.
(c) Claim 2. For w ∈ WΛ, the set {u ∈ w; ValueO(u) = 1} is not empty.
(Proof of claim)
Let w ∈WΛ. We will first show that
⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α is consistent. Let w ∈ W
Λ. Sup-
pose that
⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α is not consistent. Then there must exist a set {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}
of formulas of LKO such that ⊙[αi]ϕi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn)→ ⊥. (13)
Without loss of generality, we assume that αi 6= αj for all j 6= i such that j, i ∈
{1, . . . , n} –this assumption hinges on the fact that any stit operator distributes
over conjunction. Since w is a Λ-MCS, then the fact that ⊙[αi]ϕi ∈ w for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n implies that (⊙[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊙[αn]ϕn) ∈ w. Notice then that axiom
(Oic) yields that
⊢ (⊙[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊙[αn]ϕn)→ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn. (14)
By axiom (IA), we have that
⊢ ♦[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦[αn]ϕn → ♦([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn). (15)
Therefore, equations (14), (15), and (13) imply that
⊢ (⊙[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊙[αn]ϕn)→ ♦⊥. (16)
But this is a contradiction, since we had that (⊙[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧⊙[αn]ϕn) ∈ w, and
w is a Λ-MCS. Therefore,
⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α is consistent.
Next, we show that the union
⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w} is also consistent.
Suppose that this is not the case. Since
⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α is consistent, there must exist
sets {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and {θ1, . . . , θm} of formulas of LKO such that⊙[αi]ϕi ∈ w for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, θi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn) ∧ (θ1 ∧ · · · ∧θm)→ ⊥. (17)
Let θ = θ1 ∧ · · · ∧ θm. Since  distributes over conjunction, we have that θ =
θ1 ∧ · · · ∧ θm.Since w is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ w. In these terms, (17) implies
that
⊢ ([α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ [αn]ϕn)→ ¬θ. (18)
Once again, we assume without loss of generality that αi 6= αj for all j 6= i
such that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Analogous to the procedure we used to show that⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α is consistent, (18) implies that
⊢ (⊙[α1]ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ⊙[αn]ϕn)→ ♦¬θ. (19)
This entails that ♦¬θ ∈ w, but this is a contradiction, since θ ∈ w implies
with axiom (4) for square that θ ∈ w. Let u be the Λ-MCS that includes⋃
α∈AgsΣ
w
α ∪ {ψ;ψ ∈ w}. It is clear that u ∈ w and that ValueO(u) = 1.
Therefore, the set {u ∈ w; ValueO(u) = 1} is not empty. Therefore, we have
shown that Claim 2. is true.
We proceed with the proof of the main statement. Recall that Optimalwα is defined
as {L ∈ Choicewα ; there is no L
′ ∈ Choicewα such that L ≺ L
′}.
Let w ∈ WΛ. (⇒) Let w ∈ WΛ such that Σwα ⊆ w. We will show that for
every L ∈ Choicewα and S ∈ State
w
α , S ∩ L  S ∩ Choice
w
α (w), which would
straightforwardly imply that Choicewα (w) ∈ Optimal
w
α . For this, it suffices to
show that if ValueO(u∗) = 1 for some u∗ ∈ S ∩ L, then ValueO(o) = 1 for
every o ∈ S ∩ Choicewα (w). Therefore, take L ∈ Choice
w
α , S ∈ State
w
α , o ∈
S ∩ Choicewα (w), and u∗ ∈ S ∩ L such that ValueO(u∗) = 1. This last thing
means that
⋃
β∈AgsΣ
w
β ⊆ u∗.
As an intermediate result, we observe that for every v ∈ S,
⋃
β∈Ags−{α}Σ
w
β ⊆ v:
let v ∈ S; since u∗, v both lie in S ∈ State
w
α , this means that v ∈ Choice
w
β (u∗)
for every β ∈ Ags − {α}, so that item (b) above implies that Σwβ ⊆ v for every
β ∈ Ags− {α}; therefore,
⋃
β∈Ags−{α}Σ
w
β ⊆ v.
We want to show that ValueO(o) = 1. Since o was taken in S ∩ Choicewα (w),
then, on one hand, our intermediate result gives us that
⋃
β∈Ags−{α}Σ
w
β ⊆ o; on
the other, we have that o ∈ Choicewα (w) implies by item (b) above that Σ
w
α ⊆ o.
With these two facts, we conclude that
⋃
β∈AgsΣ
w
β ⊆ o, so that ValueO(o) = 1.
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Suppose that Σwα 6⊆ w. By item (b) above, this
implies that Σwα 6⊆ o for every o ∈ Choice
w
α (w), so that ValueO(o) = 0 for
every o ∈ Choicewα (w). We will show that there exists an action in Choice
w
α that
dominates Choicewα (w).
From Claim 2. we know that the set {u ∈ w; ValueO(u) = 1} is not empty.
Take u∗ ∈ {u ∈ u; ValueO(u) = 1}. We will show that Choicewα (u∗) is the
action that we are looking for, i.e., we will show (⋆) that for every state S ∈
Statewα , S ∩ Choice
w
α (w) ≤ S ∩ Choice
w
α (u∗), and (⋆⋆) that there exists a
state S∗ such that S∗ ∩ Choicewα (u∗) s S∗ ∩ Choice
w
α (w). For (⋆), take any
S ∈ Statewα . We want to show that S ∩ Choice
w
α (w) ≤ S ∩ Choice
w
α (u∗).
Since for any o ∈ S ∩ Choicewα (w) we have that ValueO(o) = 0, this en-
tails rather straightforwardly that S ∩ Choicewα (w) ≤ S ∩ Choice
w
α (u∗). For
(⋆⋆), we set Su∗ =
⋂
β∈Ags−{α} Choice
w
β (u∗). It is clear that Su∗ ∈ State
w
α
and that u∗ ∈ Su∗ ∩ Choice
w
α (u∗). Similarly, we have that (IA)K implies that
Su∗ ∩ Choice
w
α (w) 6= ∅. Since for any o ∈ Su∗ ∩ Choice
w
α (w) we have that
ValueO(o) = 0, it is clear that Su∗ ∩ Choice
w
α (u∗)  Su∗ ∩ Choice
w
α (w). Now,
our results (⋆) and (⋆⋆) together render that Choicewα (w) ≺ Choice
w
α (u∗), and this
implies that Choicewα (w) /∈ Optimal
w
α .
(d) Let w ∈ WΛ and L ∈ Choicewα − Optimal
w
α . By Claim 2., there exists u∗ ∈ w
such that ValueO(u∗) = 1. Firstly, from item (c), we get that Choice
w
α (u∗) ∈
Optimalwα . The fact that L ∈ Choice
w
α − Optimal
w
α implies with item (b) that
ValueO(w) = 0 for every w ∈ L, so that S ∩ L ≤ S ∩ Choicewα (u∗) for every
S ∈ Statewα (⋆). On the other hand, if we take S∗ to be the unique state in State
w
α
such that u∗ ∈ S∗, then it is clear that S∗ ∩ Choicewα (u∗)  S∗ ∩ L (⋆⋆). Our
results (⋆) and (⋆⋆) together render that L ≺ Choicewα (u∗).
As for the previous results for⊙S , we first observe that for α ∈ Ags, the S5 axioms
for the combination of operatorsKα are theorems of Λ, which entails that the relation
R◦ ≈α is an equivalence relation. For each w ∈W
Λ, we will denote by αk[w] the set
{v ∈ WΛ;Kαϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v}. Since the proof of the following lemma is the most
important new development of the present work, we include its basic steps (the details
are provided in the supplement).
Lemma 3 (Existence for subjective ought). Fix α ∈ Ags and w ∈WΛ.
(a) For every formula ϕ of LKO, ⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ w iff Kαϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ αk[w] such
that Γ vα ⊆ v.
(b) For every v ∈ [[Choicewα (w)]]
w′
α (w ≈α w
′), Γwα ⊆ w iff Γ
v
α ⊆ v.
(c) Γwα ⊆ w iff Choice
w
α (w) ∈ S− Optimal
w
α .
(d) For each L ∈ Choicewα − (S− Optimal
w
α ), there exists L
′ ∈ S− Optimalwα such
that L ≺s L′. Thus,M, w  ⊙S [α]ϕ iff ∀L ∈ S− Optimalwα , ∀w
′ such that w ≈
w′, M, v  ϕ for every v ∈ [[L]]w
′
α .
Proof. (a) (⇒) We assume that ⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ w. Since w is a Λ-MCS, this implies with
axiom (Cl) that Kα ⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ w , so that the fact that v ∈ αk[w] yields that
⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ v. The assumption that Γ vα ⊆ v then entails that Kαϕ ∈ v. (⇐) We
work by contraposition. Suppose that ⊙S [α]ϕ /∈ w. This implies that ⊙S [α]ϕ /∈
v for every v ∈ αk[w], for if there existed v ∈ αk[w] such that ⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ v,
then Kα ⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ v by axiom (Cl) and thus ⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ w, contradicting our
assumption. Therefore, we take v∗ ∈ αk[w], where we know that ⊙S [α]ϕ /∈ v∗.
The union Γ v∗α ∪ {Kαψ;Kαψ ∈ w} ∪ {¬Kαϕ} is consistent. Let u be the Λ-
MCS that includes Γ v∗α ∪ {Kαψ;Kαψ ∈ w} ∪ {¬Kαϕ}. We observe that for
every v ∈ αk[w], Γwα = Γ
v
α . Then we have that u ∈ αk[w], that Γ
u
α = Γ
v∗
α ⊆ u,
and thatKαϕ /∈ u.
(b) Let w′ ∈ WΛ such that w ≈α w′, and let v ∈ [[Choicewα (w)]]
w′
α . (⇒) Assume
that Γwα ⊆ w. Taking v in [[Choice
w
α (w)]]
w′
α implies that w ≈α v. Let Kαϕ ∈
Γwα . By assumption, we have that Kαϕ ∈ w. Axiom (4) for Kα then implies that
KαKαϕ ∈ w. Since w ≈α v, Kαϕ ∈ v as well. Therefore, we have shown that
Γwα ⊆ v. (⇐) Analogous.
(c) (⇒)Assume thatΓwα ⊆ w. We show that for everyL ∈ Choice
w
α ,L s Choice
w
α (w).
This comes from the fact that for anyw′ such that such thatw ≈α w′, if ValueS(u∗) =
1 for some u∗ ∈ [[L]]w
′
α ∩S, then ValueS(o) = 1 for every o ∈ [[Choice
w
α (w)]]
w′
α ∩
S. (⇐)Wework by contraposition.Assume thatΓwα 6⊆ w. The set {u ∈ w; ValueS(u) =
1} is not empty. Take u∗ ∈ {u ∈ w; ValueS(u) = 1}. It is the case that Choice
w
α (u∗)
dominates Choicewα (w) in the order ≺S .
(d) Let L ∈ Choicewα − (S− Optimal
w
α ). We know that there exists u∗ ∈ w such that
ValueS(u∗) = 1. From item (c) above, we get that Choice
w
α (u∗) ∈ S− Optimal
w
α .
Notice that the fact that L ∈ Choicewα − (S− Optimal
w
α ) implies with items (b)
and (c) above that that for every w′ such that w ≈α w
′, ValueS(o) = 0 for ev-
ery o ∈ [[L]]w
′
α . Therefore, it is clear that for every w
′ such that w ≈α w
′ and
every S ∈ Statew
′
α , [[L]]
w′
α ∩ S ≤s [[Choice
w
α (u∗)]]
w′
α ∩ S (⋆). On the other
hand, if we take S∗ to be the unique state in State
w
α such that u∗ ∈ S∗, then
[[Choicewα (u∗)]]
w
α ∩S∗ s [[L]]
w
α ∩S∗ (⋆⋆). Our results (⋆) and (⋆⋆) together render
that L ≺s Choicewα (u∗).
with this we conclude the proof.
Lemma 4 (Truth Lemma). Let M be the canonical Kripke-estit model for Λ. For
every formula ϕ of LKO and every w ∈W
Λ, we have thatM, w  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. We proceed by induction on ϕ. The cases with the boolean connectives are stan-
dard. It remains to deal with the modal operators. For formulas involving, [α], andKα
both directions follow straightforwardly from Lemma 1 (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
As for the operators for the objective and subjective oughts, we have the following
arguments:
– (“⊙[α]”)
(⇒) We work by contraposition. We assume that ⊙[α]ϕ /∈ w. By Lemma 2 (a),
we get that there exists v′ ∈ w such that Σwα ⊆ v
′ and [α]ϕ /∈ v′. By Lemma
1 (2), this implies that there exists v ∈ w such that v′Rwαv and such that ϕ /∈ v.
By induction hypothesis, we get that M, v 1 ϕ. From Lemma 2 (c), we know
that Choicewα (v) = Choice
w
α (v
′) ∈ Optimalwα , but this means that there exists
an “action” in Optimalwα –namely Choice
w
α (v
′)– such that v ∈ Choicewα (v
′) and
M, v 1 ϕ, which implies by Lemma 2 (d) thatM, w 1 ⊙[α]ϕ.
(⇐) We assume that ⊙[α]ϕ ∈ w. By Lemma 2 (a), we get that [α]ϕ ∈ v′ for every
v′ ∈ w such that Σwα ⊆ v
′. Take L ∈ Optimalwα . From Lemma 2 (b) we know that
Σwα ⊆ v for every v ∈ L. Therefore, for every v ∈ L, we have that [α]ϕ ∈ v, which
implies by axiom (T ) for the stit operator that for every v ∈ L, ϕ ∈ v. By induction
hypothesis, we get that for every v ∈ L,M, v  ϕ, so thatM, w  ⊙[α]ϕ.
– (“⊙S [α]”)
(⇒) We work by contraposition. We assume that ⊙S [α]ϕ /∈ w. By Lemma 3 (a),
we get that there exists v′ ∈ αk[w] such that Γ v
′
α ⊆ v
′ and Kαϕ /∈ v′. By Lemma
1 (3), this in turn implies that there exists v ∈ WΛ such that v′ ≈α v and such that
ϕ /∈ v. Let ov ∈ w be such that v ≈α ov (we know that such ov exists because
condition (US)K guarantees that the fact that v
′ ∈ αk[w] implies that there exists
ov in w such that v
′ ≈α ov , so that transitivity of ≈α renders that v ≈α ov as
well). We observe that the fact that ov ≈α v implies that v ∈ [[Choicewα (ov)]]
v
α.
Now, by induction hypothesis, we get that M, v 1 ϕ. From Lemma 3 (b) we get
that the facts that Γ v
′
α ⊆ v
′ and v′ ≈α ov imply that Γ ovα ⊆ ov, so that Lemma 3
(c) then implies Choicewα (ov) ∈ S− Optimal
w
α . This means that there exists an
“action” in S − Optimalwα –namely Choice
w
α (ov)– such that v ∈ [[Choice
w
α (ov)]]
v
α
andM, v 1 ϕ, which implies by Lemma 3 (d) thatM, w 1 ⊙S [α]ϕ.
(⇐) We assume that ⊙S [α]ϕ ∈ w. By Lemma 3 (a), we get that Kαϕ ∈ v for
every v ∈ αk[w] such that Γ vα ⊆ v. Take L ∈ S− Optimal
w
α . From Lemma 3 (b)
we know that for every w′ such that w ≈β w′ , Γ v
′
α ⊆ v
′ for every v′ ∈ [[L]]w
′
α .
Therefore, for every v′ ∈ [[L]]w
′
β , we have that Kαϕ ∈ v
′, which implies –by
axiom (T ) for the knowledge operator– that for every v′ ∈ [[L]]w
′
α , ϕ ∈ v
′. By
induction hypothesis, we get that for every w′ such that w ≈β w′ and v′ ∈ [[L]]w
′
α ,
M, v′  ϕ. Since L was taken as an arbitrary “action” in S− Optimalwα , this
means thatM, w  ⊙S [α]ϕ, according to Lemma 3 (d).
With this we conclude the proof.
Theorem 1 (Completeness w.r.t. Kripke-estit models). The proof system Λ is com-
plete with respect to the class of Kripke-estit models.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Λ-consistent formula of LKO. Let Φ be the Λ-MCS including ϕ. We
have seen that the canonical Kripke-estit model is such thatM, Φ  ϕ.
Theorem 2 (Completeness w.r.t. bi-valued BT-models). The proof system Λ is com-
plete with respect to the class of epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-models.
Proof. Let ϕ be aΛ-consistent formula ofLKO. By Theorem 1 we know that there exists
a Kripke-estit modelM and a world w in its domain such thatM, w  ϕ. Proposition
4 then ensures that the epistemic utilitarian bi-valued BT-modelMT associated toM
is such thatMT , 〈w, hw〉  ϕ.
